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P ROFESSOR LESLIE C. GREEN HAS BEEN KNOWN AS AN ACTIVE SKEPTIC since we first met, too many years ago to count. And nobody now living 
dares question his knowledge of international law. We have disagreed from 
time to time, and probably disagree about the utilitY of an International Crimi, 
nal Court (ICC). But argument in the philosophical sense, constructive debate 
and discussion, has been our style for too many years to abandon now. So here 
is my tribute to Leslie's skeptical knowledge. 
Very little has excited the international legal and human rights community 
as much in recent years as the prospect of establishing an international criminal 
court. After much political and legal labor, a Statute of such a court was 
adopted in Rome on July 17, 1998, by an overwhelming vote.! In my opinion, 
the ICC, as outlined in the Statute, cannot possibly work as envisaged. This is 
not because technical problems have been carelessly handled, although there 
do seem to be some questions, as must be expected in such a work. It is because 
the ICC is based on assumptions about the relationship of authority to substan, 
tive law and a model of the international legal order that seem unrealistic. 
First, a few indications that surfaced in the Statute as what appear to be 
merely technical flaws but in fact seem to reflect assumptions that raise the 
most serious questions. In the Preamble, paragraph three, there is reference to 
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"grave crimes"; in paragraph five to "such crimes"; in paragraph six to "interna, 
tional crimes." While the reference to "the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole" in paragraphs four and nine might re, 
late to municipal law crimes (i.e., "crimes" so designated by a municipal legal 
order, the suppression of which might be of concern to the entire international 
community),2 paragraph ten speaks of an International Criminal Court to be 
"complementary to national criminal jurisdiction," thus implying the existence 
of "crimes" not defined by municipal law but by international law directly. 
Yet the international community has no organ capable of legislating crimi, 
nallaw to its members other than the ICC as newly minted. For example, refer' 
ences in conventional wisdom to "piracy" as an "international crime" simply 
cannot stand scholarly examination. Despite much dicta referring to piracy 
''jure gentium,"3 there are no actual cases to support the notion that "piracy" is 
anything other than a municipal law "crime" in many countries.4 All attempts 
internationally to codify the essential elements of the supposed "crime," in' 
eluding the "piracy" provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, tum out to be meaningless when read carefully.s 
The notion that there is "universal jurisdiction" over the supposed "univer, 
sal offense" of "piracy" also fails when the concept of "jurisdiction" is examined 
non,polemically. There might be a universal jurisdiction to prescribe (i.e., 
States might tailor their municipal legislation to make criminal, by their respec, 
tive municipal laws, the acts of foreign "pirates" against foreigners in foreign 
territory or the high seas). But nobody has ever acknowledged a foreign coun, 
try's "universal jurisdiction," without the permission of the territorial or flag 
State, to enforce its municipal prescriptions in foreign territory or on board ves, 
sels properly flying a foreign flag, even in an "enforcing" State's own port. And 
even where there has been a permitted arrest of a foreigner on board a foreign 
vessel, the arresting authorities usually seem to lack the "jurisdiction to adjudi, 
cate" necessary for a successful prosecution unless there has been some real 
link between the offense or the offender and the State attempting to apply its 
municipal law to him or her.6 
Similarly, the notion that "war crimes" involve universal jurisdiction not 
only to prescribe but also to enforce and to adjudicate is far more than the evi, 
dence will bear. At best there have been "victors' tribunals" as at Nuremberg, 
or tribunals to which the States concerned have been construed, rightly or 
wrongly, to have agreed, such as the tribunals at The Hague and Arusha appli, 
cable to events in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda} 
The reasons why jurisdiction to adjudicate is limited even in the case of 
so' called "universal crimes" are deeply rooted in the structure of the 
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international legal order. It takes time, effort, and somebody's taxpayers' 
money to prosecute anybody for anything. The difficulties are regarded as mi, 
nor when a municipal society, a State, is the beneficiary of its own expenses. 
But whose children are to be sent to die to perform the arrest or evi, 
dence,gathering when a foreigner is to be investigated or arraigned for an act 
against other foreigners outside the territory of the State purporting to be con, 
cerned? Whose legislators determine the procedures to be followed and the ex, 
ceptions to those procedures when circumstances get complicated? Whose 
legal order governs when it appears that the enforcers have themselves violated 
the law of the State in whose territory they are acting, or commit atrocities in 
the course of acting? 
Let us look closely at a particular problem: To whom does a person wrongly 
arrested appeal, and who pays his expenses? Article 85 of the Statute of the 
ICC actually foresees this last situation and provides that in the case of a "mis, 
carriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such 
conviction shall be compensated according to law." But it does not say whose 
law or what law, implying that there is an international legal standard for such 
compensation (which is probably not the case except in the minds of advocates 
wishing to raise some precedents, but not others, to the level of customary law) 
and that the new Court will elaborate on it. That presumably means leaving 
both determinations to the very tribunal that was involved in the miscarriage 
to begin with. And out of whose pocket is the compensation to come? Presum, 
ably, the tribunal pays it out of the regular budget of the tribunal which draws 
from the fund established under Article 115 of the ICC Statute and voluntary 
contributions. Whether the parties will long consent to have their taxpayers 
amerced for errors committed by a tribunal they do not control, a tribunal that 
defines and administers its own law and does not itself respond to legislators for 
its errors, is a question better answered by faith than by experience. 
But perhaps these problems are too theoretical. Perhaps the notion is that 
the tribunal can resolve these problems and that States parties to the Statute of 
the ICC will have such an interest in the success of the tribunal that they will 
be content to have their taxpayers pay for it in its formative years. Let us tum 
instead to some more immediate problems. 
First, consider an apparently obscure problem with large implications: Arti, 
cle 90 of the ICC Statute deals with extradition of an accused to a requesting 
State under an extradition treaty, or surrender to the Court under the ICC 
Statute. I could find no mention in the Statute of the "hand over" obligation of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the laws of war.S The phrase "hand over" 
was deliberately chosen in that context to avoid the complications of municipal 
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"extradition" law and procedures, while "surrender" was apparently chosen as a 
word of art in the ICC Statute for the same reason by people who were certainly 
familiar with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their use of that different 
phrase, "hand over." Since Article 8(2) (a) of the ICC Statute, defining "war 
crimes," and Article 8(2) (c), defining various acts as criminal if performed in 
an armed conflict not of international character, both specifically refer to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, and the first provision mentions "grave breaches" 
of the Conventions to which the "hand over" provisions apply, this omission is 
incomprehensible. It appears as if the parties to the ICC Statute are not obliged 
to arrest and transfer to the custody of the ICC persons accused of the very 
"grave breaches" to which this article says it applies, leaving their trials and 
punishment to the never,used procedures already set out in the 1949 Conven, 
tions. But if that is so, it is hard to understand just what the scope of the ICC's 
authority is intended to be. Perhaps there were intended to be two inconsistent 
obligations-to "hand over" the accused to another Party to the 1949 Geneva 
Convention and to "surrender" the same person to the ICC-and disputes 
were to be resolved by the lawyers after the event actually arose. Since the 1949 
Geneva Conventions lie at the root of international obligations on each State 
party to search out those who are suspected of having committed a "grave 
breach" and to try them or hand them over for trial to another party concerned, 
it is difficult to understand what the legal obligation of States now is with re, 
gard to persons accused of the most abominable breaches of the supposed inter, 
national laws of war. It cannot have been to supplement the provisions of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions because it creates a clash of obligations, not alter, 
natives; or, if construed to create alternative obligations, does not specify how 
or by whom the inconsistencies should be resolved. It seems as if the function of 
these provisions of the ICC Statute is to supersede the 1949 Conventions, but 
not to provide for the cooperation of States parties that are intended to give 
real effect to those provisions. I cannot believe that that is what was intended, 
but the actual intent then seems hidden in inconsistent provisions now ac, 
cepted as binding by parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions who are also to 
be parties ro the ICC Statute. 
There are many questions of similar technical character in the new draft. 
But the intelligence and competence of those involved in the drafting is so far 
beyond dispute that one is left merely to wonder at their intentions and suppose 
that serious disagreements will surface as real problems begin to arise in prac, 
tice. Apparently, the tribunal itself and its associated organs are expected to re, 
solve those disputes. 
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This raises problems of an even deeper and more serious type: Exactly what 
is the scope of authority given to the institutions created by the ICC Statute? Is 
the world really willing to give that authority to those bodies? 
First is the Prosecutor. His authority is to initiate investigations when there 
is "a reasonable basis to believe that a crime [sic] within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been or is being committed; ... [unless] (c) there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the inter, 
ests of justice."9 The word "justice" is used in other provisions of the Statute. 
But nowhere does it appear that the word "justice" is conceived in its normal 
sense as essentially a word in the moral order, in which it has many different 
meanings. Aristotle addresses the concept of "justice" in his Nicomachean Eth, 
ics lO and isolates several different meanings, such as "commutative justice," 
"distributive justice" and "rectificatory justice." Each overlaps the others in 
part but not completely. To Aristotle, "law" was not necessarily related to "jus, 
tice." "Natural law" was not related to morality and was self,enforcing, like the 
law of gravity)l As to the positive legal order, it seemed obvious to Aristotle 
and seems obvious today that various tribunals have different conceptions of 
"justice" and apply them differently with no clear uniformity.l2 And each party 
before any of these tribunals seeks "justice" defined in ways different from the 
"justice" sought by other parties under their own definitions. For example, if a 
child is killed by some "national liberation" group, there will be parents who in, 
sist that "justice" is not done unless all those involved in the group are, to do 
"distributive justice," condemned to death; others will be satisfied that "com' 
mutative" justice has been done if only the direct perpetrator(s) be con' 
demned. Still others will argue that "commutative justice" can be done only if a 
child of the perpetrator is killed by the State; others that "death" is a commuta, 
tive remedy that is "unjust" because it cannot serve to rectify the injury, which 
is not rectifiable but perhaps compensable, which is as close as reality can come 
to "rectificatory justice" in the circumstances. Aristotle himself proposes math, 
ematical ratios to measure rectificatory and commutative "justice" (which at 
least one of his translators calls "reciprocity justice"). The examples can be 
multiplied ad infinitum. What this all means is that the Prosecutor is given the 
authority to determine very important things, like "justice," that are not capa, 
ble of determination to universal satisfaction. It explains in part why Thomas 
Jefferson once commented, "I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is 
just."13 
The argument that lawyers are trained to grapple with such dilemmas and 
are more trustworthy than politicians to come to generally acceptable answers 
has many flaws. First, lawyers are people like everybody else and disagree over 
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major moral issues like everybody else. They are not trained in morals as much 
as they are trained in rhetoric, and it is not clear that even appeals to morality 
will resolve problems that have baffled thinkers of the power of Aristotle for 
over 2,000 years. 
Second, the notion that lawyers or judges form an elite to which we can refer 
the most complex social dilemmas is deeply inconsistent with fundamental 
rules of democratic governance. It is a throwback to Plato's notion of rule by 
"guardians" who are by nature superior to those of us who must live by their 
rules. The inconsistency of this approach with the notion of an "Open Soc~ 
ety"14 does not necessarily mean it is a foolish notion, but it is not a framework 
for governance that should be adopted without much thought. For example, it 
is frequently forgotten that to Plato nobody was fit to be a guardian who would 
want the role. IS But I know of no supporter of the ICC who does not think that 
s/he would do well as the Prosecutor or a judge in it. The point is too deep for 
mockery; we are dealing with a real statute setting up what its supporters ex~ 
pect to be a real tribunal with real authority.16This is not to say that Plato was 
right, but neither was he clearly wrong. He raised an argument based on insight 
and character worth considering deeply. In a sense, he was posing a "natural 
law" argument based on the inborn "nature" of people-a "natural law" like 
the law of gravity or the laws of economics that has nothing to do with the 
"moral law" frequently referred to as if "natural" in disregard of several thou~ 
sand years of unmistakable evidence. 
Third, there seems to be a fundamental notion that armed conflict, whether 
international or not, is governed by rules that can be overseen by an umpire or 
referee. But when people are willing to die for a cause, or see their own children 
killed, the matter is too serious for a games approach. 
Fourth, the idea that judges or lawyers can "fill in the gaps" of an incom~ 
pletely expressed bit of legislation might serve well in areas, such as economic 
regulation, where a mistake can be digested within the system as long as the 
rules are made clear--or even during an interim period when the rules are not 
yet clear and some bankruptcies occur which a later appreciation of the rules 
within the system grappling with the problem would have avoided. But where 
life or death is involved, or personal freedom, the return to "common law 
crimes," i.e., "crimes" defined by judges after the event, is deeply disturbing. In 
the United States, "common law crimes" dropped out of consideration in 1816 
when the Executive Branch of the American government refused to bring a 
prosecution against an individual whom some judges (particularly Joseph 
Story) thought might be convicted on the basis of non~legislated rules adopted 
by judges, with knowledge of those rules attributed by judges t? all members of 
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sOciety.17 It is very distressing to many Americans to see the "common law 
crimes" approach resurrected under other names and rationales by those who 
fancy themselves the governors, or at least the political beneficiaries, of the 
"new" system. 
There is a much deeper problem that seems to have received only polemical 
attention: ~s the object of the ICC to do "justice" or to help attain and preserve 
"peace"? To many, "justice" as they perceive it is a prerequisite to "peace." To 
others, "peace" as they conceive it is a prerequisite to "justice." I would suggest 
that assertions on both sides are simplistic and distort the complex relation, 
ships they hint at. 
"Peace" is not the result of "justice," it is the result ofimplied consent to a so' 
cial structure (possibly, in some cases, analogizeable to a "social contract") uri, 
der which the alternatives to peace are believed worse than the "injustice" that 
might be unavoidable under any current conception of a human social order. 
No doubt, in both municipal and international legal orders "peace" can be at, 
tained by a draconian criminal law system, "just" or "unjust," depending on the 
value judgment of each evaluator, under which dissent is immediately pun, 
ished. Such a peace is unacceptable politically to Americans and many others 
whose value systems include a great weight to be given open political speech, 
true or not, disruptive of stability or not. 
The international legal order, as currently conceived, considers attempts to 
alter municipal legal orders by force to be beyond the legal control of interna, 
tional society as long as international peace and security are not threatened; 18 
civil wars are not illegal as a matter of international law; they are always, possi, 
bly by definition, illegal under the municipal law of the society whose author, 
ity,structure is under attack.19 While the variations in reality might be 
limitless, it is clear that such "revolutions" as have recently occurred in the for, 
mer Sovie~ Union are now occurring in many States20 and are considered to lie 
beyond the authority of the international community. 
The Statute of the ICC would seek to make criminal, as a matter of interna, 
tionallaw, violations of the limits of a soldier's privilege in armed conflicts not 
of an international character agreed by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. Under the Geneva Conventions, no State had the "standing" 
necessary to support diplomatic correspondence or intervention in any such 
cases; the provisions were acceptable to existing States' authority,holders be, 
cause they could not, as a matter oflaw, be applied except polemically by out, 
siders or as "moral" imperatives now agreed by the apparently defaulting States 
and brought to their attention by non,governmental organizations, like Am, 
nesty International or the International Committee of the Red Cross and their 
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agents. But the polemics and moral arguments have always been available to 
outsiders. And bolstering those arguments by embodying the moral rules in 
positive documents in the form of "legal" commitments was accomplished in 
1949. The great change now has been the creation of an organ empowered to 
oversee the internal affairs of States parties and limit the application of force 
used either in revolution or to suppress that revolution. 
The ideal commends itself. But it is very difficult to see how this arrange~ 
ment can work in the current legal and political order. Who should arrest the 
generals in command of the forces defending an authority structure, whether 
established or revolutionary, already in place-Ariel Sharon, Saddam Hussein, 
Yasser Arafat, a Russian general involved in the Chechnya campaign, the 
Chechen leaders? And surely the evidence of recent experience in Somalia and 
elsewhere makes it clear that even foreign troops sent in as world~police occa~ 
sionally commit acts which amount to indictable war crimes. In most cases, 
these last can be governed well by their own municipal military organizations. 
But not in the former cases and not in all of the latter. Can a Prosecutor under 
Article 53 of the Statute be placed in position as the referee of revolutions? It 
seems to me that even if the positive law placed him or her in that position, the 
States agreeing to the Statute would refuse to carry out the obligations that a 
diligent and objective Prosecutor would need carried out if s/he were to per~ 
form his or her statutory functions. Indeed, in Article 54 of the Statute, the au~ 
thority of the Prosecutor seems to be restricted. S/He is authorized to "request 
the presence" of witnesses but not compel it; to "seek the cooperation of any 
State" but not to demand it and not to act within a State's territory without its 
permission. I doubt that these provisions can be strengthened to give the Prose~ 
cutor the necessary authority at the expense of States parties to the Statute. It 
is even more doubtful that s/he could assert the necessary authority over revo~ 
lutionary groups that are not even parties to the Statute, and thus not subject 
to its obligations, unless there is a serious move to world governance and to 
abolish the legal and political effects of even a successful revolution. 
With regard to international armed conflicts, the situation is also untenable. 
Suppose, in an international armed conflict like the Gulf War of 1991, a mi1i~ 
tary leader in the position of General Norman Schwarzkopf were to be ar~ 
raigned for ordering the bombing of what later turned out to be a civilian bomb 
shelter. Would a State in the position of the United States not argue that its 
own legal order was operating and capable of handling the situation? But would 
that assertion be believed by the relatives of those civilians who had been 
killed? Or anybody else? And if somebody in the position of General 
Schwarzkopf were to be surrendered to the ICC for trial, how could s/he defend 
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him/herself without revealing information that the United States would feel 
should not be revealed on the ground of national security,21 such as informa~ 
don received through covert sources or radio intercepts that the civilian bomb 
shelter overlay a military installation. 
And if the Prosecutor waits until the battle or-war is finished, the situation 
would be just as bad. Could a victorious general be surrendered for interna~ 
tional judgment when s/he is a national hero? It is frequently forgotten that 
Admiral Karl Donitz, the Nazi successor to Hitler, was convicted of declaring 
unrestricted submarine warfare in the teeth of a submission by America's own 
Admiral Chester Nimitz that he had done the same thing in the Pacific war on 
December 7th, 194 I.22 The point is not that Donitz should have been acquit~ 
ted of the charge or that Nimitz should have been tried; it is that without a 
world government it would have been politically impossible to arraign Nimitz, a 
national hero of the victor State, before any tribunal for the very act for which 
Donitz was convicted. It is not difficult to see the equivalent political impossi~ 
bility of an international trial in analogous situations to arise in the future. 
On a more theoretical level, the impossibility of producing "legal" results 
when States ignore their apparent obligations under the ICC Statute, and the 
demonstrable lack of State action under the 1949 Geneva Conventions' "grave 
breaches" provisions, with a lack of "legal" results flowing from that inaction, 
implicates Occam's Razor, the "law of parsimony." Under that principle of 
philosophic and legal construction, the simplest rule with the fewest excep~ 
tions must always be taken as the primary rule to account for reality.23 Under 
that rule, a commitment without results in the legal order but with results in 
the moral or political orders is better categorized as a moral or political rule 
than a legal rule. The supposed and much ignored obligation to search out for~ 
eigners committing a "grave breach" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and to 
"hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party con~ 
cerned" seems to be obviously a rule of morality and politics, not a rule oflaw. 
Failure to carry out the obligation may result in political tensions and oppro~ 
brium on the part of those concerned with the morality of giving asylum to per~ 
sons who have committed atrocities in armed conflict. It has not produced 
results in the international legal order. 
While this skims the surface of why the ICC Statute is unlikely to help 
achieve the results that its advocates expect from it, it ignores alternatives that 
have also been ignored by the legal and human rights communities that have 
pushed so hard to have their value systems institutionalized in the interna~ 
tionallegal order by means of the positive law. While the ICC does not fore~ 
close parallel possibilities that might be more successful in actually enforcing 
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that value system, it undercuts those parallel possibilities by making them seem 
poor alternatives that withhold "justice", from the aggrieved by making "jus~ 
tice" a legal instead of a moral term. 
Every normative order has its own enforcement techniques. If the default be 
regarded as a matter of positive law, then the enforcement techniques of the 
positive law must be used to "right the wrong." But if the default is viewed as a 
moral default, then a "Truth and Reconciliation" Commission might be the 
best way to achieve the closure that peace requires, with moral opprobrium and 
social ostracism the "sanction." And if the requisite level of opprobrium does 
not flow, if the wicked find haven among their like~thinking fellows, then it is 
hard to see how peace and security would flow from the application of positive 
law sanctions to the wicked. There are two obvious problems. First, the wicked 
constituents might want to defend "their" wicked leader, and military activity 
with its attendant atrocities on all sides is the most likely result of attempts to 
"arrest" him or her. Second, if "legal justice" in the normal municipal criminal 
law sense is to be done in some cases, only chaos would be the likely result. For 
example, to do what some demand as "justice" in Rwanda, surely every Hutu 
who killed an innocent Tutsi, and every Tutsi who killed an innocent Hutu 
should face trial and punishment. Failing that, the hordes of unhappy survivors 
would threaten to make peace and reconciliation impossible. How many hun~ 
dred thousand trials and how many prisons should there be? Or will the "world" 
apply its sanctions only to a select few? Who selects the "few"? A prosecutor ap~ 
plying objective standards? What standards? What is "objective" in these cir~ 
cumstances that would permit the murderer of a child to go free while the 
inciter or political leader who killed nobody goes to prison? And who is the 
"world"? Slightly more than one fifth of the population of the world is Chinese 
and seems more or less content to live under a government whose conception 
of "human rights" seems very different from that of the framers of the ICC Stat~ 
ute. The same may be said of the slightly less than one~fifth of the world's popu~ 
lation that is Hindu; and the same may also be said of about one~fifth of the 
world's population who participate in revealed religious traditions, organiza~ 
tions, or sects-whose "divine law" perceptions forgive or even encourage the 
killing of non~members of their clan or society. Three~fifths is a majority. And 
while it might be argued that not all Chinese, Hindus, and adherents to abso~ 
lutist religions would agree with their elected, born, or appointed spokespeople 
in matters relating to "human rights," it can equally well be argued that not all 
Americans and other participants in the European enlightenment agree with 
their political leaders about such questions.24 So let us abandon majority rule 
430 
Alfred P. Rubin 
and move to rule by the enlightened few-us. But that was Plato's answer, and 
it is inconsistent with open society ideals we also purport to have. 
I conclude that openness leading to moral examination of value systems is 
probably the closest we can come to "justice" if "peace" is really our aim in this 
imperfect world. 
Until now, the accommodation of the international legal order to the quest 
for enforceable moral standards has been to encourage States in the interna, 
tiona I legal order to agree to general rules, usually masquerading as legal princi, 
pIes but actually moral principles, and enforce them through their own 
interpretation of them in their own municipal legal orders. That is why the 
1949 Geneva Conventions contain their uniformly incomplete "hand over" 
provisions quoted above. It is also why, in the Genocide Convention of 1948, 
the enforcement provision provides that: "The Contracting Parties undertake 
to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legis, 
lation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particu, 
lar, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the 
other acts enumerated ... "25 And "Persons charged with genocide ... shall be 
tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was 
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction 
with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its juris' 
diction."26 Until now, i.e., for about 50 years, no State has accepted the juris' 
diction of any international tribunal for such acts although, under severe 
political pressure, the Serbian part of the Bosnian State is argued to have au, 
thorized the spokesperson of the Republic of Yugoslavia (Slobodan Milosevic) 
to accept such an obligation for it. How the other parties to the pertinent inter, 
national accords construe themselves into making definitive interpretations of 
a document of delegation to which they are not parties is a bit mysterious as a 
matter oflaw, however simple it might seem as a matter of politicsP Whether 
any State accepting the ICC Statute conceives it applying to its own leaders 
acting in its own territory remains to be seen. Whether other States parties will 
send their young people to be killed and spend their own taxpayers' money to 
enforce the mandate of an international tribunal applied in the territory of a 
second State and affecting only the people of that State, also remains to be 
seen. 
The overarching problem confronting the statesmen and lawyers of the 
world is probably not that of creating a tribunal to reduce "war" or political vio, 
lence to the point that atrocities can be punished by some outside umpire. War 
itself is atrocious; it kills innocent people, hurts others, destroys property, and 
in many cases is temporary in its political results. The "civilized" world 
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celebrated with joy the Kellogg,Briand Pact that was supposed to end recourse 
to war as an instrument of national policy in 1928. It was followed by two de, 
cades of bloodshed and misery. The current United Nations Charter requires 
international disputes to be settled by peaceful means and forbids the threat or 
use of force in international relations.28 It is only when these provisions of the 
positive law are violated or evaded29 that atrocities can occur that cross inter' 
national boundaries. But today, the greater number and extent of atrocities, 
like genocide, occur wholly within the boundaries of a single State, like Bosnia 
or Rwanda. The real question is whether international law as such is capable of 
addressing these situations. 
The traditional answer would be "No." The situation of internal atrocities is 
analogous to the situation of child abuse within a municipal legal order-ev, 
erybody condemns it and would like to do something about it, but the conflict, 
ing social values involved in some institutional oversight over family life, and 
the difficulties of finding people whom society could trust to make decisions in 
the best interest of society, make the resolution of child abuse issues too diffi, 
cult to be satisfactorily resolved in Western society. Now, it appears as if the 
magic solution would be to have the international equivalent of child abuse, 
genocide, policed by the very system that has failed so obviously in municipal 
societies: the Courts. 
Let me make a radical suggestion. Some problems are not capable of being 
resolved by the application of positive law. Some social problems are moral 
problems and better resolved through the application of remedies provided in 
the moral order, not the legal order. The obvious remedy in the moral order for 
genocide is exposure and opening borders to grant at least temporary haven to 
the victims. In some cases, the moral remedy might indeed involve revolution 
or even an international armed conflict. That appears to have been the case 
when Idi Amin was accused of presiding over the butchering of a significant 
part of the population of Uganda. In that case, the moral imperatives appear to 
have overcome the legal imperatives forbidding recourse to force in interna, 
tional affairs. And nobody but Idi Amin and his supporters would complain. 
Similarly, the complaints about North Viet Nam's occupation of Cambodia to 
end the unspeakable regime of Pol Pot were muted by the thought that nothing 
and nobody else would do the job. Morality turns out to be a counter,weight to 
the positive law, and the dominant system in some cases. Perhaps it is what 
Cicero had in mind when he wrote of the "true law [vera lex]" that should be 
obeyed even if inconsistent with the positive law, the decrees of the Roman 
Senate}O 
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How can the enforcement tools of morality be brought into play in cases of 
military atrocity? Exposure is the obvious first step. Criminal trials might be a 
State's response in its own interest; not trials of foreigners for committing 
atrocities on other foreigners abroad, but trials of people subject to its own ju-
risdiction for committing atrocities against anybody whom that jurisdiction, al-
lowing reciprocal authority to other municipal orders under current 
conceptions of the equality of all sovereigns before the law, considers within 
the range of its protection. That solution does not involve international tribu-
nals; it involves the same national tribunals that the normal laws of war pre-
scribe-national tribunals, possibly military courts-martial but not necessarily 
so. The application of municipal law in those circumstances is undertaken not 
because international law compels it, but because national interest makes it the 
best solution. An example is the United States Civil War of 1861-1865, during 
which the Union never declared or acknowledged the legal capacity of the 
Confederacy to engage in "war," but nonetheless issued the first great modem 
codification of the laws of war, the Lieber Code} 1 The United States Supreme 
Court in 1877 gave its opinion that those laws were applied as a "concession ... 
made in the interests of humanity, to prevent the cruelties which would inevi-
tably follow mutual reprisals and retaliations."32 There are many other reasons 
that could be added to those, but this is not the place for further elaboration. 
Yet another response, although hardly a "solution," might be the most diffi-
cult of all: do nothing. That is the Waldheim response. Kurt Waldheim was 
Secretary-General of the United Nations for two full terms and then President 
of Austria. He is now believed to have known about atrocities committed by 
the Nazi army in the Balkans during the Second World War and to have de-
nied involvement or even knowledge of them. He has never been brought to 
trial and it is now highly unlikely that he ever will be. But he cannot easily leave 
Austria. Nor is he likely to get the prizes and adulation that his record at the 
United Nations and in Austria would otherwise seem to have earned him. 
"Successful" leaders who cannot explain the inconsistencies that political lead-
ers always have thrown at them by their political opponents and journalists risk 
ostracism. Those who lead their countries into positions that outsiders find 
morally abhorrent, like the apartheid leaders of South Africa before Nelson 
Mandela's rise to power, find the foreigners reacting to them in ways they did 
not expect. Nobody in the current world wants to deal with a bigot, so the 
United States enforced its "Sullivan Rules"; it limited American investment in 
South Africa to that which could stand moral scrutiny. 
Steps like these, isolation of morally dubious individuals and adjustment of 
legal relations with morally dubious legal orders, do not "fix" the perceived 
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injustices or apply foreign "law" to them. They indicate the abhorrence of other 
States and ordered trading partners, thus putting political as well as moral pres' 
sure on the persons and legal orders whose actions seem questionable. The per' 
sons or legal orders that feel victimized by those steps of ostracism or restrictive 
trade rules can respond, if they like. It might be that the outsiders are wrong, or 
fail to understand the complexities of the actions or system they condemn. In 
that case, explanation and openness might result in a relaxation of the con' 
demnations. But it might not; politics frequently acts on the basis of 
misperceptions more than facts. And it is also possible that the Waldheims or 
masters of a racist South Africa feel themselves morally justifiable even though 
the facts seem to others to indicate morally dubious behavior or outright big, 
otry. But what is the alternative? Invasion that kills people and destroys prop, 
erty? Criminal charges in a tribunal that has no positive law to rely on but finds 
"law" in the moral indignation of a Prosecutor and a majority of judges who, as 
human beings, are also fallible? 
I should conclude by wishing that objective "justice" were clear and avail, 
able via a tribunal of scholars of the integrity and perception of Leslie Green. 
But until cloning becomes the norm, or society in general is prepared to accept 
the infallibility of its lawyers, such solutions seem beyond our reach. The con, 
clusion is not pessimistic, but realistic. Much can be done, but it is better to do 
nothing in the legal order than to confuse it with the moral order and attempt 
to enforce our view of morality as if binding on others in a universal criminal 
law. 
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bothered to make out a prima facie case. There have been no known actions under these 
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The apparent failure of the ICC to step into the gap, if there is a gap, seems unaccountable and I 
hope I misread the Statute. 
9. ICC Statute, art. 53 (l)(a) and (c). See also art. 53 (2)(c). 
10. ARISTOTIE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, in INTRODUcrION TO ARISTOTIE pp. 402-411 
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and human (positive) law being uttered at the will of the legislator, who is human and therefore 
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13. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1781-1785), Query 18, as 
quoted in BARTIETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (14th ed. 1968), at 471a. 
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run by guardians, while the non-fascist ideals of our time dictate a "republic" responsive to its 
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own time, where legal power was, as it is today, frequently the result of the interplay of many 
other normative orders than positive law and morality. In PLUTARCH, LIFE OF DION, and 
PLATO, LETTER VII, it is possible to see the clash between Plato's notion of a government based 
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normative orders imposed themselves on his decisions. 
15. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book I, 346e-347, in PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 88-89 (Desmond 
Lee trans., 2nd rev'd ed., Penguin, 1974). 
16. I say this harshly because of the notable application of political polemics to the discussions 
by some advocates of the ICC. See, for example, the comments by jerome Shes tack and David 
Stoelting, respectively President of the American Bar Association and Chairman of its 
Coordinating Committee on the ICC, dismissing as "myth" the bases for various objections to the 
ICC. 1 ON THE RECORD 21, july 16, 1998. In my opinion, Shestack and Stoelting misrepresent 
for polemical purposes the objections they mention and dismiss even those few as if they were all 
and without serious examination. 
436 
Alfred P. Rubin 
17. See United States v. Coolidge, 14 u.s. (1 Wheaton) 415 (1816); in the United Kingdom, 
common law crimes still exist in theory, but scholarly lawyers normally cite MATTHEW HALE, 
PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1678), for the definitions of crimes not defined by Parliament in 
legislation. In civil law countries, the issue does not exist any longer. In the ICC Statute, Articles 
22 and 23, the well-known aphorisms are cited as if beyond dispute and without attribution: 
Nul/urn crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege. There is no discussion as to precisely what is 
meant by "lege"-whether it includes common law or is confined to statutory law. lfit is intended 
to reduce the "crimes" to those already defined by judges, these articles seem inconsistent with 
the authOrity given to the tribunal elsewhere, notably Article 21(1) (b) of the Statute, which 
authorizes the tribunal to find its law in othenvise undefined "principles and rules of 
international law, " among other sources. 
18. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(1) ("The Organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members") and 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter ... "). Many, if not most, if not all, the Members of the 
United Nations owe their current authority-structure to a violent revolutionary change 
somewhere in their history. 
19. I suppose it is possible to conceive of a society that includes revolutionary struggle against 
its authority-structure as a lawful part of its authority-structure, but I know of no such society in 
reality. 
20. For example, in Russia, where the status of Chechnya has been the subject of horrible 
fighting, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a civil war seems to have broken 
out in the Eastern areas and has reached the point at which it is acknowledged by the central 
government. There are, distressingly, many such situations. 
21. See ICC Statute, art. 72(6): "Once all reasonable steps have been taken to resolve the 
matter through cooperative means, and if the State considers that there are no means or 
conditions under which the information or documents could be provided or disclosed without 
prejudice to its national security interests, it shall notify the Prosecutor or the Court of the 
specific reasons for its decision, unless a specific description of the reasons would itself result in 
such prejudice to the State's national security interests." There are several other pertinent 
provisions of the ICC Statute, none of which would help the Court significantly in the situation 
posed. And if the ICC could legally demand the information, it would nonetheless be refused 
because its exposure would be at the expense of the national security of the State involved as that 
State sees matters. It is difficult to imagine any State submitting itself to an outside evaluation of 
its own national security interests, certainly not exposing the information to outsiders before an 
internally binding internal evaluation. 
22. W.T. MALLISON, SUBMARINES IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS, esp. app. B at 
192-195 (Interrogation of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz on May 11, 1946, taken from 40 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 109-111). Mallison's book is Volume 58 (1966) ofthe 
Naval \Var College "Blue Book" series ofInternational Law Studies. 
23. The rule, reputedly first formulated by William of Occam in the first half of the fourteenth 
century, says, "Essentia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem [assumptions should not be 
made unless necessary]." The language involves the neo-Platonic notion of "essences," which is 
now usually considered unnecessary by application of the rule itself. See the article by T.M. 
Lindsay at 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 965 (11th ed. 1911). 
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24. The morality and political utility of abortion and the death penalty are only two of many 
examples of such disagreement in "enlightened" countries concerning matters that many would 
regard as aspects of "human rights." 
25. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. V, 78 
U.N.T.S.277. 
26. Id., art. VI. 
27. For a fuller analysis of this and many other oddities of the arrangements under which a 
tribunal was established at The Hague to try people involved in atrocities in the former 
Yugoslavia, see Rubin, Dayton and the Umits of Law, supra note 7. The weaknesses of the 
tribunal's system were apparent from the moment of its creation. See Rubin, An International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, supra note 7. 
28. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3} and 2(4}. The Charter is a treaty, and these provisions are 
normally considered binding as a matter of international customary law. See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Judgment, 1984 I.e.J. 392, 425, (para. 76); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 1986I.C.J. 14.38; and 
decisions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 in the latter case, holding American violations of "customary 
international law" to exist in various acts which also violated Articles 2(3} and 2(4} of the U.N. 
Charter. 
29. A common evasion is when authority over territory is involved and both sides regard the 
dispute as internal to themselves. An example is the Falklands/ Malvinas war between Argentina 
and the United Kingdom. See Rubin, Historical and Legal Background of the Falkland!lvfalvinas 
Dispute, in THE FALKLANDS WAR 9-12 (Alberto Coli & Anthony Arend eds., 1985). That is 
probably the reason why Iraq categorized Kuwait as legally part of Iraq before the invasion of 
1990 that led to the Gulf War of 1991. 
30. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA AND DE LEGIBUS (C.W. Keyes, trans., Loeb Classical Library, 
1928, 1977), at 210 (Latin}/211 (English). 
31. General Orders No. 100 promulgating the Instructions for the Government of Armies of 
the United States in the Field, in Schindler & Toman, supra note 8, at 3. 
32. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 186,24 L.Ed. 716, 718 (1877). To those reasons can be 
added the importance of maintaining a sense of moral superiority among the fighters' 
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together with many other advantages. 
438 
